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ABSTRACT 
 In CBS Corporation v. FCC, the D.C. Circuit struck down the 
Federal Communication Commission’s rules for protecting 
confidential information that it collects during certain merger 
proceedings. In response, the Commission released a new order, 
pursuant to the Charter, Time Warner, and Bright House merger 
proceeding, for protecting confidential information. This iBrief 
analyzes the policy and legal implications of the Order, arguing 
that the Order is unlawful because it violates the Trade Secrets 
Act and notice-and-comment rulemaking requirements. 
INTRODUCTION 
 The Communications Act of 1934 requires the Federal 
Communications Commission to review every transfer of one of its 
licenses. 1  Thus, Commission officials are inevitably interjected into 
business transactions involving cell phone, landline, broadcast radio, 
satellite radio, and cable companies—among others.2  
 When determining if it should grant a license transfer, the 
Commission asks whether “public interest, convenience, and necessity 
will be served” by the transaction. 3  As Jon Sallet, the Commission’s 
General Counsel, has pointed out, the public interest standard goes 
“beyond the traditional strictures of antitrust laws (most notably the 
Clayton Act).”4 For instance, the Clayton Act instructs the Department of 
                                                     
† Duke University School of Law, J.D. expected 2017; George Washington 
University, B.A. Economics and Religion, 2014. 
1 47 U.S.C. § 310(d) (2012). 
2 See generally, e.g., Consent to the Transfer of Control of Licenses XM Satellite 
Radio Holdings Inc. to Sirius Satellite Radio Inc., 23 FCC Rcd. 12426 (Aug. 5, 
2008) (approving the Sirius and XM merger subject to conditions).  
3 47 U.S.C. § 310(d).  
4  Jon Sallet, Gen. Counsel, Fed. Commc’ns Comm’n, Remarks at the 
Telecommunications Policy Research Conference: “The Federal 
Communications Commission and Lessons of Recent Mergers & Acquisitions 
Reviews” (Sept. 25, 2015), http://transition.fcc.gov/Daily_Releases/Daily_ 
Business/2015/db0925/DOC-335494A1.pdf. 
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Justice to challenge transactions that would “substantially lessen 
competition.”5  
 In determining if transactions serve the public interest, the 
Commission forces transacting parties 6  to supply it with confidential 
information. Often a submitting party’s confidential information 
necessarily implicates a third party. 7  Parties with an interest in the 
transaction8 are allowed to review and comment on the merging parties’ 
confidential information, which—in theory—assists the Commission with 
its public interest evaluation. 9  To protect the transacting parties’ 
confidential information, the Commission only makes certain information 
available to reviewing parties’ after granting protective orders.10 But the 
rules protecting confidential information are far from clear and recent 
Commission orders and the D.C. Circuit case CBS Corporation v. FCC 
have made the process murkier. Additionally, the Commission sometimes 
leaks confidential information if it determines that the release is “in the 
interest of the agency.”11 Thus, private parties like CBS or ESPN should 
be unpersuaded that the Commission protects their confidential 
information. 
                                                     
5 15 U.S.C. § 18 (2012). 
6 Transacting parties are referred to throughout this article as “submitting” or 
“merging” parties. 
7  A “third party” has a confidential interest in information submitted to the 
Commission, but they are not a submitting party. 
8 Parties with an interest in the transaction are referred to throughout this article 
as “reviewing” or “commenting” parties. 
9 See 47 U.S.C. § 309(b) (2012) (“[N]o . . . application . . . shall be granted by the 
Commission earlier than thirty days following issuance of public notice.”). This 
review process has been challenged by many for being discriminatory. For 
example, former senior technology advisor in President Obama’s administration, 
Phil Weiser, has remarked that the “FCC sometimes uses such proceedings to 
decide issues that are otherwise pending in industry rulemakings—leading to one 
set of rules for those who have merged and another set of rules for similarly 
situated parties who have not.” Phil Weiser, Institutional Design, FCC Reform, 
and the Hidden Side of the Administrative State 36 (Univ. Colo. Law Sch. Legal 
Studies Research Paper Series), http://tiny.cc/ksaf5x.  
10  Charter Commc’ns, Inc., Time Warner Cable, Inc., & Advance/Newhouse 
P’ship for Consent to Assign or Transfer Control of Licenses & Authorizations, 
30 FCC Rcd. 10360, 10365 (Sept. 11, 2015), https://apps.fcc.gov/edocs_public/ 
attachmatch/FCC-15-110A1_Rcd.pdf [hereinafter Order].  
11 See Mario Trujillo, Inspector General Investigating FCC Leaks, THE HILL 
(May 6, 2016, 9:38 AM EDT), http://thehill.com/policy/technology/278978-
inspector-general-investigating-fcc-leaks (discussing two Commission leaks).  
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I. BACKGROUND 
A. An Ambiguous Beginning: The Commission’s First Procedures 
for Protecting Confidential Information 
 The Commission first released a comprehensive framework for 
protecting confidential information and issuing protective orders in its 
1998 Confidential Information Statement.12 The statement makes it clear 
that under section 0.457(d) of the Commission’s rules13—a provision 
implementing part of the Freedom of Information Act— certain trade 
secrets or “Exemption 4 Materials” 14  are not to be made routinely 
available for public inspection.15  The statement requires there to be a 
“persuasive showing” why confidential information is necessary to the 
review process before the information is publicly disclosed.16 To meet the 
persuasive showing standard, the Commission must identify a 
“compelling public interest” in favor of disclosure.17 The Commission 
also “balanc[es] . . . the interests favoring disclosure and non-disclosure.”18 
The availability of protective orders is one factor the Commission 
considers when engaging in this balancing.19  
 The Commission used the rules set forth in the Confidential 
Information Statement from 1998 to 2014.20 However, the statement is 
unclear about two material issues: First, it is unclear if issuing a protective 
order qualifies as a public disclosure. 21 Second, the Commission’s 
definition of what constitutes necessary information within the persuasive 
showing framework is vague and possibly contradictory: In one instance 
                                                     
12  Current Policy Concerning Treatment of Confidential Info., 13 FCC Rcd. 
24816 (July 28, 1998) [hereinafter Confidential Information Statement]. 
13 47 C.F.R. § 0.457 (2016). 
14 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(4) (2012) (Exemption 4 of the Freedom of Information Act 
protects “trade secrets and commercial or financial information obtained [by the 
government] from a person [that is] privileged or confidential.”).  
15 See Confidential Information Statement, supra note 12, at 24818–19.  
16 Id. at 24822 (citing 47 C.F.R. § 0.461). 
17 Id. at 24822–23.  
18 Id. at 24822 (reasoning that the Supreme Court contemplated this in FCC v. 
Schreiber, 381 U.S. 279, 291–92 (1965)). 
19 See id. at 24824 (discussing the Commission’s reliance on protective orders 
when determining whether or not to disclose the confidential information). 
20 The Commission’s bureaus issued many protective orders between 1998 and 
2014 pursuant to the Confidential Information Statement. See, e.g., News Corp. 
& DirecTV Grp., Inc. & Liberty Media Corp. for Authority To Transfer Control, 
22 FCC Rcd. 12797, 12797 (July 10, 2007). 
21 See id. at 24831 (reasoning that “protective orders can . . . permit[] limited 
disclosure for a specific public purpose” (emphasis added)).  
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the Confidential Information Statement states that the Commission “insists 
upon a showing that the information is a necessary link in a chain of 
evidence that will resolve an issue before the Commission” before the 
information will be released.22 In another instance, the statement states that 
information does not need to be “‘vital’ to the conduct of a proceeding, 
necessary to the ‘fundamental integrity’ of the Commission process at 
issue, or . . . have a direct impact on the requestor.”23 
B. The D.C. Circuit Strikes Down The FCC’s Most Recent Order 
Protecting Confidential Information 
 In 2014, the Commission considered two proposed mergers: 
AT&T sought to merge with DirecTV—in a transaction ultimately 
approved—and Comcast sought to merge with Time Warner Cable and 
Charter Communications—in a transaction that was ultimately 
withdrawn.24 In line with past practices and the Confidential Information 
Statement, the Commission in April released a protective order (April 
Order) for the transaction.25 Third parties like CBS and Viacom, who had 
their confidential information submitted to the Commission by the 
merging parties, challenged the April Order because they did not want 
their proprietary information disclosed during the merger-review 
process.26 
 In response to the third parties’ challenges, a division of the 
Commission called the Media Bureau sought public comment for new 
protective order procedures.27 In response to those comments, the Media 
Bureau released new rules (October Order) governing protective orders.28 
The October Order provided content companies more protection than the 
April Order.29 It “prevented disclosure of confidential information ‘until 
any objection is resolved by the Commission and, if appropriate by [a] 
court.’”30 The order also allowed third parties to object to parties who 
compete with them reviewing their confidential information, instead of 
                                                     
22 Id. at 24822–23. 
23 Id. at 24829. 
24 See CBS Corp. v. FCC, 785 F.3d 699, 700 (D.C. Cir. 2015). 
25 See id. at 702.  
26 Id. 
27 Id. 
28 Id. 
29  See id. (reasoning that more protection was established by a guarantee of 
judicial review for all disclosure decisions).  
30 Id. 
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just parties who compete with the merger applicants. 31  Despite these 
reasonable safeguards, the October Order was short lived.32  
 In November, the Media Bureau reconsidered the October Order, 
and released the Amended Protective Order. 33  This order truncated 
protections for third parties.34 Then the Commission, in a 3-2 vote, denied 
the content companies’ Application for Review of the Media Bureau’s 
Amended Protective Order.35  
 The content companies then sued the Commission claiming that 
the Amended Protective Order was unlawful because the Commission 
does not have the legal authority to disclose their confidential information 
and because the Amended Protective Order’s truncated judicial review 
process was procedurally and substantively unlawful.36 The D.C. Circuit 
addressed these issues in CBS Corporation v. FCC.37 
 First, the court addresses whether the “persuasive showing 
standard” applies to information released pursuant to a protective order.38 
The court “assumes” that the standard applies because the Amended 
Protective Order specified that it applies and the Commission’s attorney 
in oral arguments conceded that it applies.39 
 Second, the D.C. Circuit addresses what the persuasive showing 
standard entails. The court relies on the Confidential Information 
Statement.40 The statement is clear that disclosure must be in the public 
interest and it must be a good idea on balance,41 but it is unclear about how 
“necessary” information must be for the review process before the 
                                                     
31 Id. 
32 Id. at 703. 
33 Id. 
34 See id. at 702–03 (discussing how the Amended Protective Order eliminated 
judicial review of certain Commission decisions and gave submitting parties less 
time to object to the release of information). 
35 Id. at 703. 
36 See id. (explaining that third parties opposed the Amended Protective Order 
because, among other reasons, it was inconsistent with past agency practices). 
37 Id. at 699. 
38 See id. at 704 (addressing whether the persuasive showing standard applies 
because 47 C.F.R § 0.457 (2016) states that “a persuasive showing as to the 
reasons for inspection will be required in requests for inspection,” and in CBS 
there was no requestor—rather, the Commission was attempting to disclose 
information on its own initiative).  
39 Id. at 704. 
40 Id. 
41 Id. at 705. 
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Commission may release it.42 It states—ambiguously—that information 
must be a “necessary link in a chain of evidence” to be released, but that 
information does not need to be “‘vital’ to the conduct of a proceeding” to 
be released.43 Analyzing the Confidential Information Statement, the court 
held that the Commission’s “necessary-link finding is an unavoidable 
component of the persuasive showing.”44 To sum up the court’s holding: 
to release confidential information “the Commission must explain (1) why 
disclosure is in the public interest, (2) why it is a good idea on balance, 
and (3) why the information serves as a ‘necessary link in a chain of 
evidence.’”45 
 The Amended Protective Order satisfied the first two criteria, but 
did not satisfy the third criterion. 46  The Confidential Information 
Statement gave the Commission authority to release information “central” 
to the proceeding.47 But, pursuant to the Amended Protective Order, the 
Commission may only release information if it is “absolutely needed” or 
“required,” which is a stricter standard.48 
 The court noted that the Commission could clarify or amend its 
current policy.49 But the court indicated that the persuasive showing must 
still apply.50 In other words, the Commission’s rules must encompass the 
persuasive showing standard, but the Commission could still clarify what 
that standard entails.51 
 The court also held that the Amended Protective Order’s truncated 
judicial review process is unlawful because it amounts to a “substantive 
and important departure from prior Commission precedent.”52 The order 
only gives parties five days to challenge the Bureau’s decision, and 
information is released before the FCC Commissioners or a court may 
                                                     
42 See id. at 706 (discussing the wide range of definitions of the word “necessary,” 
including anywhere from “relevant” or “central” to “absolutely needed” or 
“required”). 
43 See Confidential Information Statement, supra note 12, at 24829. 
44 CBS, 785 F.3d at 705. 
45 Id. 
46 Id. at 705–06. 
47 Id. at 706. 
48 Id. (supporting its holding by relying on the Trade Secrets Act, 18 U.S.C. § 
1905 (2012), and its decision in Qwest Commc’ns Int’l Inc. v. FCC, 229 F.3d 
1172, 1180–84 (D.C. Cir. 2000)). 
49 Id. at 708. 
50 See id. (reasoning that the persuasive showing standard may be amended or 
clarified—not scrapped). 
51 See id.  
52 Id. 
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prevent its release.53 Previously, parties had more time to object to the 
release of information, and information would not be released until the full 
Commission or a court reviewed all timely objections.54 Since the order 
does not provide any reasoned analysis for this departure, the court held it 
to be unlawful.55 
 For the above reasons, the court vacated the Amended Protective 
Order.56 In response, the full Commission without notice-and-comment 
rulemaking, in a controversial 3-2 vote, adopted a new order (Order) on 
September 2, 2015 detailing the rules for all protective orders.57 
II. THE ORDER 
A. Description of the Order 
 The Order states that the Commission has the authority to release 
information during licensing proceedings to reviewing parties pursuant to 
protective orders.58 It details a new process for parties objecting to the 
release of information.59 And it purports to clarify certain rules for the 
release of information without protective orders.60 These rules applied to 
the Time Warner, Charter, and Bright House proceeding, and they will 
apply to all future proceedings, but the Commission has delegated 
authority to its various Bureaus to modify the exact scope of future 
orders.61 
 The Commission believes its authority to release confidential 
information pursuant to protective orders is well-established.62 According 
to the Commission, the Supreme Court in FCC v. Schreiber63 held that 
                                                     
53 Id. 
54 Id. at 708–10. 
55 Id. The court also indicated that there might be substantive concerns with the 
five-day rule even if the Commission provided a reasoned analysis for it. Id. at 
710. 
56 Id. 
57 Order, supra note 10. 
58 Id. at 10365–72. 
59 Id. at 10373–77.  
60 Id. at 10378–86. 
61 See id. at 10378. Any significant change to these rules would presumably need 
full Commission approval. Moreover, the objection process may not be changed 
by the bureaus. Id. at 10376 n.97.  
62 Id. at 10365–66. 
63 FCC v. Schreiber, 381 U.S. 279, 289, 291–92 (1965). 
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section 4(j) of the Communications Act64  permits the Commission to 
release confidential information without violating the Trade Secrets Act.65 
 The Order states that the “persuasive showing standard” does not 
apply to information released pursuant to protective orders. 66  The 
Commission reasons that this standard is only applicable when 
information is released publicly, and information released pursuant to a 
protective order does not qualify as a public release.67 Because it decides 
that the persuasive showing standard is inapplicable, the information does 
not have to be “necessary.”68 
 All information in the record may be reviewed pursuant to a 
protective order, no matter how sensitive it is to a transacting party or a 
third party.69 There are no limits on the number of people who may review 
information under a protective order.70 
 The Order does provide some protections: reviewing individuals 
must not be involved in “competitive decision-making” or be “in a 
business relationship with the party whose confidential information is at 
issue.”71 Reviewing individuals must have an interest in the proceeding or 
represent a party that has an interest in the proceeding. 72  Reviewing 
individuals may only use the confidential information for commenting in 
                                                     
64 47 U.S.C. § 154(j) (2012) (“The Commission may conduct its proceedings in 
such manner as will best conduce to the proper dispatch of business and to the 
ends of justice.”). 
65  Order, supra note 10, at 10365–66, 10366 n.41 (reasoning that the Trade 
Secrets Act only permits the release of information “authorized by law” and 
section 4(j) is such authorization); see also 18 U.S.C. § 1905 (2012) (“Whoever, 
being an officer or employee of the United States . . . publishes, divulges, 
discloses, or makes known in any manner or to any extent not authorized by law 
any information coming to him in the course of his employment . . . shall be fined 
under this title, or imprisoned . . . .”). 
66 Order, supra note 10, at 10384–86. 
67 Id. at 10369 & n.65. 
68 Id. 
69 See id. at 10369, 10371 n.76 (stating that previously the Commission gave extra 
protections to certain extremely confidential information, but that, because 
protective orders provide sufficient protection, extra protection is not needed for 
any information no matter its sensitivity).  
70 Id. at 10371. Moreover, the Order exempts support personnel of lawyers and 
consultants from having to sign acknowledgements of a protective order’s rules. 
The reviewing parties still must sign acknowledgments that they are complying 
with Commission rules. Id. at 10377.  
71 Id. at 10371. 
72  Id. Presumably, any person or organization could become a party in a 
proceeding if they claimed to be interested in the result of the transaction. 
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the current proceeding.73 Sanctions and criminal penalties may be imposed 
on certain individuals for violating the terms of a protective order.74 The 
Order states that these protections “are more than sufficient to protect even 
highly competitively sensitive information” from being leaked.75 
 The Order restores submitting parties and third parties’ previously 
truncated rights to object to an individual reviewing their confidential 
information.76 Although all the information in the record is available to a 
reviewing party,77 the Order permits submitting parties to object to the 
release of specific information in the record to all parties,78 but only in 
“extraordinary” circumstances will the Commission grant such a request.79 
The Order also “allow[s] third parties who have an interest in the 
confidential information to raise objections to [r]eviewing [p]arties.” 
Previously, only submitting parties could object to specific individuals 
reviewing their information.80  
 Also, information is no longer released until the Commission or a 
court has resolved an objection. 81  The objection process is the same 
whether or not a party is objecting to a blanket release of information or 
to the release of information to a specific reviewing individual.82  The 
merging party—or the submitting party—has ten business days to object 
to its release, and a third party must object “as soon as practical.”83 If the 
Bureau overrules either objection, the parties have ten days to ask the full 
Commission to review the Bureau’s decision, and in that time no 
information will be released.84 If this application for review is denied, 
parties have ten days to file a request for a judicial stay of the information’s 
release.85 
 Finally, the Order details the rules for the release of information 
not pursuant to a protective order (so called “public release”). The 
                                                     
73 Id. at 10367–68. 
74 Id. 
75 Id. at 10371. 
76 Id. at 10374–77. 
77 Id. at 10369. 
78 Id. at 10373–74. 
79 Id. at 10374–75. 
80 Id. Third parties could not object at all and submitting parties could not object 
to the blanket release of any information. Id. 
81 Id. at 10375. 
82 See id. at 10373–74, 10376 (setting forth that both processes are modeled off 
Freedom of Information Act regulations). 
83 Id. at 10374. 
84 Id.  
85 Id.  
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Commission claims it is clarifying its existing rules and not promulgating 
a new rule.86 To access confidential information, a requestor must make a 
“persuasive showing.” 87  A persuasive showing is made only if, after 
balancing various interests, the requestor shows that public disclosure 
serves the public interest.88 The Order states that information does not 
need to be “absolutely needed” or “required.”89 Furthermore, it states that 
Commission rules never required information to be absolutely needed 
after 1998, but to the extent they did, Commission rules are now 
changed.90 
B. The Dissenters 
 Two Commissioners vigorously dissented to the Order.91  The 
dissenters have two legal criticisms and some policy concerns. One legal 
criticism is that, unlike the Confidential Information Statement, the Order 
was promulgated without satisfying notice-and-comment requirements.92 
A corollary to this critique is that the Order amounts to a substantive rule 
change.93 This dissenters have this concern because the Commission has 
abandoned the persuasive showing standard for protective orders and the 
necessary link test for the persuasive showing standard.94  
 The other legal concern is that section 4(j) of the Communications 
Act does not give the Commission the authority to publicly release 
information.95 According to Commissioner Pai, after the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Chrysler Corp. v. Brown,96 the Commission does not have the 
authority to disclose trade secrets under general housekeeping statutes.97 
                                                     
86 See id. at 10378–79 (clarifying the proper meaning of persuasive showing in 
light of CBS Corp. v. FCC, 785 F.3d 699 (D.C. Cir. 2015)). 
87 Id. at 10379. 
88 See id. at 10379–80. 
89 Id. at 10380–81; contra CBS, 785 F.3d at 706. 
90 Order, supra note 10, at 10380–81. 
91  See id. at 10397 (Pai, Comm’r, approving in part and dissenting in part) 
(dissenting against all parts of the Order except for its objection procedures); id. 
at 10404 (O’Reilly, Comm’r, dissenting) (dissenting against all parts of the 
Order). 
92 Id. at 10398 (Pai, Comm’r, approving in part and dissenting in part); see also 
id. at 10404 (O’Reilly, Comm’r, dissenting). 
93 See id. at 10398 (Pai, Comm’r, approving in part and dissenting in part). 
94 See id. at 10399–10401. 
95 Id. at 10402–03. 
96 Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281 (1979). 
97  Order, supra note 10, at 10402–03 (Pai, Comm’r, approving in part and 
dissenting in part). 
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He reasons that (4)(j) is a general housekeeping statute when read in 
context, so the Commission has no authority pursuant to it.98 
 Moreover, for policy reasons, the dissenting Commissioners are 
concerned that too much competitively sensitive information will be 
released pursuant to protective orders. 99  Commissioner O’Rielly in 
particular believes protective orders are inadequate to prevent confidential 
information from being publicly disclosed.100  
III. POLICY EVALUATION AND CRITICISMS 
 The Order is a mixed bag from the perspective of third parties. It 
protects third parties’ confidential information better than the Amended 
Protective Order, but the Order should not have dropped the persuasive 
showing standard.  
A. An Improved Objection Process 
 The Order benefits third parties and submitting parties because 
their confidential information is not released until after the full 
Commission or a court reviews an objection, and because the parties may 
object to having certain confidential information released to anyone. They 
may also object to having all confidential information released to a specific 
reviewing individual. Pursuant to the Amended Protective Order, a Bureau 
would release information before the full Commission had a chance to 
review an objection or before a court at the opportunity to issue a stay 
order. The CBS court invalidated this process for procedural reasons and 
questioned it for substantive reasons.101 In response to the CBS court’s 
decision, the Commission promulgated the Order, which provides 
submitting parties and third parties the right to seek a judicial stay and a 
Commission review of Bureau decisions before the Bureau releases any 
confidential information.  
 Moreover, the Order’s objection process is certainly fair for 
submitting parties. They have ten days to challenge confidential 
information’s release, which is ample time.102 
                                                     
98 Id. 
99 Id. 
100  See id. at 10405 (O’Rielly, Comm’r, dissenting) (railing that there is a 
“profound misunderstanding of the sensitive nature of some of this material, 
which will be now be exposed under inconsequential and ineffective protections,” 
calling the Commission “hopelessly naïve,” and arguing that a reviewer may not 
“unremember” information). 
101 CBS Corp. v, FCC, 785 F.3d 699, 709–10 (D.C. Cir. 2015). 
102 Order, supra note 10, at 10374.  
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 Third parties, in contrast to submitting parties, must challenge the 
release of confidential information “as soon as practical.”103 There is an 
obvious concern that a Bureau may release information before it is 
“practical” for a third party to object to that information’s release—for 
example, if a third party is never made aware that its confidential 
information is going to be released, it never would have an opportunity to 
object to such information’s release.  
 The Order’s attached Protective Order that governed the 
submission of information for the Time Warner, Charter, and Bright 
House transaction provides a solution to this problem: before a submitting 
party submits its information to the Commission, it “shall notify any 
known Third-Party Interest Holders who have a confidentiality 
interest.”104  Insofar as the Bureau includes this language in all future 
proceedings, third parties will be protected. However, because this 
requirement is not contained in the Order, third parties should be diligent 
in safeguarding their interests.  
 Moreover, according to the Protective Order, copies of the 
reviewer’s Acknowledgement are to be delivered to submitting parties and 
to known third parties at least five days before the reviewing party 
accesses any confidential information.105 Assuming that this protection—
which is not contained in the Order—is contained in future protective 
orders,106 parties should be protected from reviewers with adverse interests 
to them accessing their highly sensitive information. This is because 
parties are put on notice by the Acknowledgement. 
 Another concern is that the Order, in practice, will not provide 
parties with the ability to object to the release of specific information to 
all reviewers, although the Order purports to provide parties this ability. 
The Order states that the Commission expects that only in an 
“extraordinary” situation would information be precluded from release to 
all reviewers.107 The Order highlights that a national security situation 
might qualify as an extraordinary circumstance.108 Based on this language, 
it seems like most—if not all—of these objections will be denied by the 
Bureaus. 
                                                     
103 Id. 
104 Id. at 10387 (protective order) [hereinafter Protective Order]. 
105 Id. at 10390–91. 
106 The Order does state that all future protective orders must contain the same 
objection process. One ambiguity is whether third parties are required to be 
notified pursuant to all future protective orders. See Order, supra note 10, at 
10378 & n.107.  
107 Id. at 10373. 
108 Id. at 10369 n.63.  
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 As a result, merging parties and third parties are, in effect, limited 
to objecting to an individual’s review of their confidential information. If 
they object to every individual reviewing their information on a case-by-
case basis, they are probably more likely to succeed than if they object to 
certain information being released to all reviewers. 
B. The Unfortunate Dropping of the Persuasive Showing Standard 
for Protective Orders 
 The Order’s biggest disadvantage to third parties is that the 
persuasive showing standard does not apply to protective orders.109 This is 
inconsistent with how the D.C. Circuit previously interpreted Commission 
precedent and the Commission’s attorney’s statement at oral arguments in 
CBS v. FCC.110 As mentioned previously, the Commission reasons that 
the persuasive showing standard only applies to the public release of 
confidential information, and it reasons that information released pursuant 
to a protective order is not to be publicly released. Because the persuasive 
showing standard is inapplicable, the necessary link component is also 
inapplicable to protective orders. 
 Transacting parties must give the Commission all information the 
Commission deems to be “relevant.” 111  “[A]ll of the information 
submitted to the record” will be available to reviewers pursuant to a 
protective order. So, as a result of this Order, any and every piece of 
confidential information that a Bureau staffer deems relevant to a 
transaction is available to any reviewing party. Thus, for example, 
Comcast representatives could have easily reviewed Time Warner’s secret 
contract with ESPN without justifying the need for that information. This 
is a gross intrusion on corporate privacy, and is unnecessary for the 
Commission’s public interest evaluation. The Commission did not need to 
know what Comcast thinks about Time Warner’s ESPN contract to 
evaluate Time Warner’s proposed merger. 
 To be sure, there are some limitations on who may access this 
confidential information. But the telecommunications world is very 
small. 112  The same players represent businesses time and time again 
during Commission proceedings and there is no way for them to 
“unremember” confidential secrets. 113  The Commission is naïve in 
                                                     
109 Id. at 10384.  
110 See CBS Corp. v. FCC, 785 F.3d 699, 704 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (stating how the 
Commission’s attorney at oral arguments conceded that the persuasive showing 
applies to protective orders). 
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thinking that sign-in disclosures, acknowledgement forms, professional 
sanctions, and a few other light measures will be enough to prevent the 
disclosure of confidential information outside the bounds of protective 
orders.  
 Additionally, “private information from the FCC regularly 
leaks.”114 For example, the Senate Commerce Chairman has investigated 
whether the Commission leaked information about a budget for the 
Lifeline program to scuttle a bipartisan deal.115  Even the fact that the 
Commission Chairman Tom Wheeler had decided to circulate an order to 
approve the Charter, Time Warner, and Bright House transaction was 
leaked before Commissioners voted on the deal. 116  Businesses with 
confidential information being released pursuant to protective orders 
should be concerned that their information is getting leaked as well. 
C. Public Release Protections are Eviscerated 
 Transacting parties and third parties are damaged by the 
Commission’s interpretation of the persuasive showing standard for the 
public release of information. In contrast to confidential information 
released pursuant to a protective order, the Order states that the requesting 
party must make a persuasive showing for information to be released 
publicly.117 In interpreting the Confidential Information Statement,118 the 
Commission now declares that a requesting party does not need to prove 
that the confidential information it requests is “absolutely needed” or 
“required.”119  
 The standard for release of information is extremely ambiguous: 
the Commission balances and weighs various “factors” and public and 
private “interests” to determine if “disclosing the confidential information 
serves the public interest.”120 At least the Order states that “[t]here must 
be more than a ‘mere chance’ the confidential information will be helpful 
and it must provide more than ‘factual content.’”121 
 Transacting parties who are forced to submit confidential 
information to the Commission or third parties implicated in information 
submitted to the Commission are left with little to no protection. Instead, 
they rely on Commission staffers using opaque standards to weigh 
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interests about whether public release is appropriate. And the Chairman of 
the Commission maintains that “he has broad authority to release 
nonpublic information unilaterally,” so confidential business information 
may not be safe.122 
IV. LEGAL CRITICISMS 
 The Order raises two distinct legal issues: First, does the 
Commission have the authority to release confidential information 
pursuant to a protective order? Second, did the Commission unlawfully 
change its rules without notice-and-comment rulemaking by modifying 
the persuasive showing standard? 
A. The Order Likely Violates the Trade Secrets Act 
 The Trade Secrets Act prohibits government agencies from 
disclosing confidential business information unless it is “authorized by 
law” to do so.123 The Commission finds its authorization in section (4)(j) 
of the Communications Act124 and in the Supreme Court case FCC v. 
Schreiber, where the Court held that (4)(j) “authorize[s] public disclosure 
of information . . . as the agency may determine to be proper,”125—
although Schreiber never mentions the Trade Secrets Act.126 Regardless, 
insofar as Schreiber authorizes the Commission to release confidential 
information without violating the Trade Secrets Act, a later Supreme Court 
case casts doubts on that authority. 
 The Court in Chrysler Corp. v. Brown held that internal 
housekeeping statutes do not provide an agency with authorization to 
release confidential information under the Trade Secrets Act. 127  An 
internal housekeeping statute deals with matters of “agency organization, 
procedure, or practice[,]” and such a statute does not authorize an agency 
to release information publicly.128 To determine an agency’s authority, the 
test is whether the text or history of the statute “indicates it is a substantive 
grant of legislative power to promulgate rules authorizing the release of 
trade secrets or confidential information.”129 Chrysler—as a later case—
                                                     
122 Trujillo, supra note 11. 
123 18 U.S.C § 1905 (2012). 
124 Order, supra note 10, at 10367 (citing 47 U.S.C. § 154(j) (2012)). 
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supersedes Schreiber if section (4)(j) qualifies as an internal housekeeping 
statute. 
 So, is section (4)(j) an internal housekeeping statute? The statute 
clearly governs the Commission’s internal affairs—especially since the 
statute’s language has remained the same since 1934.130  
The Commission may conduct its proceedings in such manner as will 
best conduce to the proper dispatch of business and to the ends of 
justice . . . Any party may appear before the Commission and be heard 
in person or by attorney. Every vote and official act of the 
Commission shall be entered of record, and its proceedings shall be 
public upon the request of any party interested.131 
 Moreover, section (4)(j) is surrounded by obvious housekeeping 
statutes. For example, section (4)(h) explains “three members of the 
Commission constitute a quorum.”132 And section (4)(k) mandates that the 
Commission submit annual reports to Congress.133 It is very unlikely that 
Congress intended to confer upon the Commission substantive authority 
to release extremely competitively sensitive information in between 
mundane, internal affairs provisions.134  
 The Commission’s justification for releasing information pursuant 
to 4(j) is bizarre. It cites Schreiber and states: “Section 4(j) does not merely 
confer power to promulgate rules generally applicable to all Commission 
proceedings; it also delegates broad discretion to prescribe rules for 
specific investigations, and to make ad hoc procedural rulings in specific 
instances.” 
 It then cites Southwestern Bell Telephone Co., 13 FCC Rcd 3602, 
3608 ¶ 19 (1997), a Commission order, and states that “[w]e have the 
authority, when addressing request for confidentiality, to impose or 
modify protective orders on a case-by-case basis as circumstances 
dictate.”135 None of its purported justifications for releasing information 
discuss why 4(j) is not an internal housekeeping statute.  
 The closest the Commission gets to addressing the issue is by 
stating that “section (4)(j) is different from the internal housekeeping 
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statute at issue in Chrysler.” 136  To be sure, the two “statutes” are 
different—this is a truism if there ever was one.137  But they are both 
internal statutes. 
 In sum, because section (4)(j) is an internal statute, the 
Commission likely lacks the statutory authority to publicly release 
confidential information pursuant to it. 
B. The Order Likely Violates the APA’s Notice and Comment 
Requirements 
 Unlike when it adopted the Confidential Information Statement, 
the Commission did not use notice-and-comment rulemaking to 
promulgate the Order. Importantly, the Commission claims that it is 
“clarifying,” rather than “amending,” its regulations.138 If the Order is 
irreconcilable with the Confidential Information Statement, the Order was 
required to go through notice-and-comment rulemaking.139 It also must go 
through notice-and-comment procedures if it “effects a substantive change 
in existing . . . policy.”140 In contrast, the Order does not need to go 
through notice-and-comment rulemaking if it qualifies as an 
“interpretative rule” that merely “describes the [Commission’s] view of 
the meaning of [its] existing . . . regulation[s].”141 
 Two of the Order’s “clarifications” arguably qualify as 
substantive changes to existing policy. First, it states that the persuasive 
showing standard does not apply to confidential information released 
pursuant to a protective order; it only applies when information is released 
publicly without a protective order. Second, it states that the “necessary 
link in a chain of evidence” test is not a component of the persuasive 
showing standard. 
 It is crucial to this analysis to determine what the Commission’s 
rules were prior to the Order. And as previously mentioned, the 
Confidential Information Statement is somewhat unclear. However, on 
balance, it appears that the Confidential Information Statement stated that 
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the persuasive showing standard applies to protective orders and makes 
the necessary link a component of the persuasive showing standard.142 
1. Persuasive Showing Standard 
 The Confidential Information Statement, clearly states that a 
persuasive showing must be made when Exemption 4 material is 
disclosed.143 The Confidential Information Statement then states that “the 
rules also contemplate [that] the Commission will engage in a balancing 
of the interests favoring disclosure and non-disclosure.” 144  In the 
subsequent paragraph, the Commission explains that it relies on 
“protective orders to balance the interests in disclosure and the interests in 
preserving the confidentiality of competitively sensitive information.”145 
Quite clearly, the benefits and disadvantages of protective orders are to be 
considered by the Commission when it balances interests. And the 
Commission must balance interests in addition to determining whether a 
persuasive showing has been made. So the obvious conclusion is that the 
persuasive showing standard applies to protective orders in the 
Confidential Information Statement. 
 Moreover, this conclusion is supported by the Amended Protective 
Order.146 The Commission wrote that its “rules permit the disclosure of 
such information on a ‘persuasive showing’ of the reasons in favor of its 
release.” 147  In addition to the persuasive showing standard, the 
Commission also “balances . . . the interests favoring disclosure and 
nondisclosure.” 148  As a part of this balancing, the Commission has 
historically “relied on special instruments, such as protective orders, to 
serve the interests in disclosure while preserving the confidentiality of 
competitively sensitive materials, rather than excluding relevant 
documents from the record.”149 Clearly the persuasive showing standard 
historically applied to the Commission’s protective orders. 
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 Additionally, in CBS v. FCC150 the D.C. Circuit151 reasoned that 
the persuasive showing standard applies to protective orders. To be sure, 
the court only assumed the standard applies152 because under Commission 
regulations “[a] persuasive showing as to the reasons for inspection will 
be required in requests . . . for inspection of such materials.”153 Under the 
CBS facts, however, there was no requestor according to the court, because 
the Commission was releasing information on its own initiative.154 Thus, 
the court only assumed that the Commission must make a persuasive 
showing as if it was the party requesting the information.155 The court 
came to this conclusion in light of Commission precedent as well as the 
Commission’s lawyer acknowledging at oral arguments that the 
persuasive showing standard applies to information released pursuant to 
protective orders.156 
 In light of the Confidential Information Statement, the Amended 
Protective Order, and the CBS holding, it seems clear that the persuasive 
showing was a Commission requirement prior to the Order. Removing this 
requirement qualifies as a “substantive change in existing policy.”157 Thus, 
the Order likely required notice-and-comment rulemaking to be lawful, 
and that never occurred. If the Order is challenged, it would likely be 
struck down for violating notice-and-comment requirements. 
2. Necessary Link Test 
 The necessary link test appears to be a part of longstanding 
Commission policy. No parties dispute that prior to the Confidential 
Information Statement the necessary link test was a part of the 
Commission’s review process. 158  The question is whether the 
Confidentiality Information Statement scraps this test. 
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 The Confidentiality Information Statement states that—as part of 
the persuasive showing standard—“the Commission has adhered to a 
policy of . . . ‘insist[ing] upon a showing that the information is a necessary 
link in a chain of evidence’ that will resolve an issue before the 
Commission.159 Crucially, this statement is in the past tense. It is unclear 
if it is simply describing what the Commission has done or if it is 
articulating the past and future rule. Future passages in the statement 
clarify this somewhat. 
 The statement asserts that the persuasive showing standard is 
retained.160 Thus, it seems to state that the standard is retained in its current 
form, which would include the necessary link test. But the Confidentiality 
Information Statement’s subsequent sentences cast doubt on this 
conclusion. The Commission states that information does not need to be 
“‘vital’ to the conduct of a proceeding, necessary to the ‘fundamental 
integrity’ of the Commission process at issue, or . . . have a direct impact 
on the requestor.”161 
 The CBS court held that the “necessary-link finding is an 
unavoidable component of the persuasive showing the regulations 
require.” 162  The court held that the Commission treated the language 
preceding the necessary link test in the Confidential Information Statement 
as binding and not just as a statement of past Commission policy, so the 
necessary link test must also be binding.163 This is far from persuasive, but 
it is the best possible analysis of the Confidential Information Statement. 
 This interpretation is plausible only if there is a difference 
between information being part of a necessary link in the chain of evidence 
to resolve issues before the Commission and information being vital to the 
proceeding. Here, there is a difference.  
 Not every issue before the Commission is vital. Certain 
information may be necessary to resolve some issue before the 
Commission, but the Commission could still approve or deny a merger 
without resolving the issue. For example, although it might be material to 
the Commission to seek comment on information about Time Warner and 
Charter’s contracts with ESPN, surely this is not vital to the Commission’s 
determination if the transaction serves the public interest. So by not 
mandating that information be vital, the Commission was simply refusing 
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to implement a more stringent standard as a part of the necessary link test; 
they did not remove the test. 
 In sum, because the Commission removed the necessary link test 
in the Order from its rule governing the release of confidential information 
without notice-and-comment rulemaking, the Order is likely procedurally 
unlawful. 
 To be sure, the Commission—insofar as it has the statutory 
authority to release highly confidential information pursuant to protective 
orders—probably has the authority to drop the persuasive showing 
standard from protective orders and alter or remove the necessary link test, 
but it does not have the authority to do so without a notice-and-comment 
rulemaking. 
CONCLUSION 
 From the perspective of merging parties and third parties, there 
are some good aspects of the Order. Chiefly, they have more rights to 
object to information release and now a Bureau will not release 
information until an objection is resolved by the full Commission or a 
court. Regrettably, too much information is available to reviewing parties 
and confidential information will likely leak. Moreover, the Order likely 
violates the Trade Secrets Act and the Administrative Procedure Act’s 
notice-and-comment rulemaking requirement. If a party decides to 
challenge the Order, which might not happen because it is not always wise 
for businesses to litigate with a body that will continue to regulate it, a 
court will likely strike down the Order for one or both of these reasons. 
